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FOURTH SESSION

Friday, April 24, 1914, 10.30 o'clock a.m.

The Society met at 10.30 o'clock a.m., Mr. JAMES BROWN SCOTT presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Hitherto the Monroe Doctrine has been considered in the light of its origin and in the light of its historical application, and the misconceptions and the limitations of the doctrine have been pointed out. We now come to consider the questions as to whether or not the Monroe Doctrine is to be considered as national or international, what countries benefit by the Monroe Doctrine, and more especially the development of the Latin American attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine, as the doctrine in its beginnings was meant to apply more especially to the Latin American countries in their relations with the United States. It gives me very great pleasure to introduce to you as the speaker on the subject, "The Monroe Doctrine: National or International?" Mr. William I. Hull, Professor of History in Swarthmore College.

Mr. HULL. Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: I hope that you heard the question mark which should follow the words of the title of this paper. It is omitted, I observe, from the program, but there is a question mark after the word "international." It should be, "The Monroe Doctrine: National or International?"

I trust that it will not be considered by this audience that this paper raises a very questionable issue, but, nevertheless, I am going to give you my own frank convictions upon the subject, however they may be characterized.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE: NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL?

ADDRESS OF WILLIAM I. HULL,
Professor of History in Swarthmore College

The Monroe Doctrine has been, during the past twelve months, the subject of such animated and far-reaching debate that it may be well

at this point to observe the example of Daniel Webster, who began his reply to Senator Hayne with the words:¹

Mr. President, When the mariner has been tossed for many days in thick weather, and on an unknown sea, he naturally avails himself of the first pause in the storm, the earliest glance of the sun, to take his latitude and ascertain how far the elements have driven him from his true course. Let us imitate this prudence and, before we float further on the waves of this debate, refer to the point from which we departed, that we at least may be able to conjecture where we now are.

We Americans in discussing the Monroe Doctrine appear to be concerned chiefly with the growth and present scope of the doctrine itself, and seldom if ever pause to consider the reasons why the United States undertook and continues to enforce it by its own unsupported sanction. It is the object of this contribution to the great debate to consider chiefly the major premise of the accepted conclusion, and to examine the *Monroe*, or national, sanction of the doctrine, rather than the doctrine itself. In other words, the writ of *quo warranto* having been issued against the United States, let us frankly respond to the summons to show why our country alone, rather than the family of nations as a whole, or several members of it, at the least, should be bearing the burden in our own and the world's behoof.

As a preliminary to this discussion, it is essential to state as concisely as possible the present status of the doctrine. In the first place, its *terminus ad quem* has been changed or greatly broadened. Directed at first against Spain and the Holy Alliance, it has become a warning to the governments of Europe, Asia, and Latin America as well,—for the whole world, indeed, to heed and obey.

From the territorial point of view, it began with an assertion of America's territorial integrity against European acquisitions either by force or by colonization; but it now prevents the voluntary transfers of American soil by Old World Powers to other Old World Powers, by New World Powers to Old World Powers, and doubtless, if the case should arise, by New World Powers to other New World Powers. In these days of large corporations, also, it has been made to forbid

¹In the United States Senate, January 26, 1830.

any foreign corporation subsidized or controlled by an Old World government to acquire land in the Americas which is so situated as to menace the safety or communications of the United States. At present, the interpretation or extension of the doctrine in this direction has not gone far enough—to exclude *all* foreign corporations from doing business on the soil of the Americas; but there is sufficient elasticity in such phraseology for indefinite expansion in the future, and already some foreigners are complaining that such is the logical outcome of President Wilson's Mobile declaration against Latin American "concessions."

From the point of view of American self-government, the doctrine began with a declaration against the restoration to Latin America of the monarchical government of Spain. Its author condemned, however, any intervention on the part of the United States in favor of a republican form of government; and this condemnation was repeated by his successors, even including President Polk,—who in most matters far out-Monroed Monroe. But within the past two decades, our self-restraint in this particular has been cast to the winds. One of our most highly esteemed Secretaries of State,—intoxicated, possibly, by the exuberance of a temporary pugnacity,—declared that "the United States is practical sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interposition." Every administration since that time has made popular government of the fiat variety one of its specialties in dealing with Latin America.

In President McKinley's administration, the Platt Amendment was applied to Cuba to protect the new republic against any hankering on its part after the fleshpots of Spain or other European monarchies, by providing that Cuba should make no treaties with foreign governments tending to destroy its independence or territorial integrity and should contract no public debts disproportionate to its ordinary revenue, and that the United States should or might intervene to protect Cuban independence and to maintain a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty.

In President Roosevelt's administration, we insisted that a province of Colombia should exercise the divine right of revolution, at the same time we prevented the mother country from exercising its right of coercion over its recalcitrant daughter, and we speedily recognized and permanently guaranteed, for a substantial *quid pro quo*, the inde-

pendence of the new republic. In the same administration, also, the Big Stick was raised to conserve popular government in the Dominican Republic, this time by preventing revolutionists from looting the custom-houses for their sinews of war, and, after the rebellion was suppressed, by collecting and distributing the revenues so as to prevent other revolts and to forestall foreign Shylocks from demanding their pound of flesh in the form of Dominican lands.

In President Taft's administration, the Roosevelt policy in the Dominican Republic was continued, one revolt was suppressed and another prevented, one president was compelled to resign and his successor was sustained,—contrary to Napoleon's dictum,²—on the points of American bayonets, while American appointees continued to collect and administer the customs. Nicaragua's popular government, also, was the recipient of President Taft's particular attention. One president was forced to resign; his successor, whom the people thought they had elected, was refused recognition, and a revolt against him was supported by 2,350 United States marines, who drove him into exile, placed a third president in the chair, captured five of the republic's towns, suppressed another revolt, distributed food supplies to the victims of the war, and left four hundred marines "on guard" in the republic's capital city. All this was justified on the plea of "the protection of the life and property of United States citizens and the influencing in all appropriate ways the restoration of lawful and orderly government."

In the present administration, a treaty is said to be pending between the United States and Nicaragua which, if ratified, would make the latter republic a veritable "protectorate" of our own and a base of naval operations, also, against domestic revolts, foreign land-grabbers, and European creditors in the other Central American republics. The enforcement of a fair trial of political offenders in Cuba, the "supervision" of Dominican elections, and the refusal to recognize Huerta, an enforced presidential election, and the rejection of the electoral returns, in Mexico, are all too recent to need more than a mere mention. In view of such achievements as these by an administration only one year of age, we must all recognize grave significance in President Wilson's declaration in his first annual mes-

²"You can do anything with bayonets, except sit on them."

sage that "we are the friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions."

Thus, not only in our own dependencies, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, but in our neighboring republics, which are nominally independent, our government has become the school-master in the science and art of popular government. Jefferson's and Monroe's confidence in democracy has grown into a determination that our neighbors in the Western World shall enjoy for themselves, *nolens volens*, the blessings of constitutional government, even if we are obliged to blow these blessings upon them from the guns of super-dreadnoughts.

When it is suggested that this enterprise upon which we are engaged is a rather quixotic one, that it is in fact a superlatively and preposterously altruistic one for a mere government to be engaged in, the reply which has hitherto proved sufficient is, that popular government and financial solidity are essential to Latin America's political stability, that political stability is the *sine qua non* of its territorial integrity, and that its territorial integrity is imperatively demanded by the Monroe Doctrine for the safety and peace of the United States.

We Americans who have grown restive under the heavy burden of the Monroe Doctrine have sought for some means of evading or lessening our country's responsibility, and sundry alternatives have been suggested. Some have roundly denounced it as an "obsolete shibboleth" and demanded that the United States throw it overboard from its ship of state, leaving Latin America to shift for itself, on its own resources, or with such defensive alliances as it can make in the New World or the Old. But in the present state of world politics, this policy of scuttle is rejected by the majority of Americans as fraught with certain peril to Latin America and to the United States as well. Not only is the specter of Old World territorial aggrandizement in the New World,—with its military consequences to ourselves,—seen in this policy of relinquishment, but the hope of efficient popular government throughout Latin America would be relinquished with it. If left entirely to themselves, it appears too optimistic to hope for most of these republics, as President Wilson said of Mexico in his first annual message: "And then, when the end comes [after civil war has ceased], we shall hope to see constitutional order re-

stored in distress Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions." Ambition, ignorance and lack of political training would long continue to retard the permanent adoption of constitutional government.

If, then, say other sincere critics, the United States must continue to bear the burden of the Monroe Doctrine, let us at least repress it within the straight-jacket of its modest original. The prevention of Old World conquest or colonization, and the prevention of the restoration of monarchical government, in Latin America, are surely sufficient for the safety of the United States and are as much as Latin America can expect at our hands. But *nulla vestigia retrorsum* is the law here as elsewhere in national development; and in these days of complex civilization, conquest, colonization and monarchical government assume such subtle forms that eternal vigilance or constant watchful waiting on the part of the United States is held to be the price of America's freedom from them. Through the doorways of national bonds, of industrial concessions, of land companies, and of special privileges of many kinds, may come those old enemies of the Holy Alliance era whom Jefferson and Monroe so valiantly resisted.

Let us, then, say a third class of critics, bargain with those Old World Powers from whom, in our enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, we are supposed to have most to fear,—Germany and Japan, for example,—and secure their formal recognition of the doctrine, not as a mere national policy, but as genuine international law. We have secured partial and sporadic recognition of it by some of the European Powers; let us induce them, by giving them some suitable *quid pro quo*,—such as the Philippines, or tariff concession,—to yield it once for all their formal acceptance. But students of the history of our country need not be reminded that our chief national characteristics and instincts are opposed to such international bargaining; while students of the history of international law need not be reminded that so-called international law which is based on such partial and selfish agreements is as unstable as the shifting sand of the desert or the shore.

Let us, then, say still other critics, make a direct alliance with the Great Powers of Europe,—Great Britain, Germany and France,—for the enforcement of the doctrine. If we can not make it genuine international law, let us continue it as a national policy and make an alli-

ance for its support with those European Powers which are most interested in it and which are best able to render support to it. The advocates of this plan are not Americans alone. A member of the British House of Commons³ who is travelling in our country at the present time has recently said: "We are one people and of one blood. Our King came from Germany; and I hope to see an alliance between England, Germany and the United States, with the *entente* with France maintained." These are friendly sentiments; but aside from the probable cost of such alliances as these, they run counter to our national antipathy, which has been firmly rooted ever since Washington's Farewell Address, to entangling alliances; and they run counter to that strong and ever increasing current of world-wide internationalism which is so marked a characteristic of our era, and which is opposed to partial alliances of every kind and degree.

Again, it is suggested with growing insistency that, if not with the strongest of the Old World Powers, then surely with the strongest and most stable of the New World Powers, "the A. B. C.," for example, we can make an alliance for the enforcement of a distinctively American policy. This suggestion is a revival of President Jefferson's plan of 1808 to form, through General Wilkinson, an alliance between the United States, Spanish America, and Brazil. It is a revival under greatly changed and more favorable circumstances, of course; but it would be in this twentieth century an example of atavism, of reversion to the barbarous diplomacy of the Middle Ages. For the very reason that the Monroe Doctrine is a policy which vitally concerns *all* of the twenty-one American republics, its interpretation and enforcement may not justly be left to any partial "concert" of a few of them. The injustice to the weaker Powers, and the lack of harmony among the allied Powers themselves, which must be anticipated from any such "American Concert," may be estimated from the history of the "Holy Alliance" and the "Concert of Europe." With the growth of the Latin American Powers, such a course would lead in time to the institution in this hemisphere of the precarious and portentous condition of affairs in the Old World with its triple and dual alliances, and its *ententes* which are cordial only toward their own members and inimical and menacing toward all outsiders. Again, such a "Concert of America" would necessarily be on equal terms, or it would

³Rev. C. Silvester Horne, M. P. for Ipswich.

be dominated by the United States. If on equal terms, its object would be inevitably frustrated, by disagreement both as to what should be done and as to who should do it. The recognition of Maximilian's government in Mexico by Brazil, and Chile's impression of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine in the United States' collection of the Alsop claim, are two out of many illustrations of the inevitable disagreements which would ensue under any such quadruple alliance. If the "concert" be dominated by the United States, even though only for the sake of prompt decision and effective enforcement, the A. B. C. Powers would naturally regard it as only one more and the most galling of all the evidences of the "Yankee Peril" which the A. B. C. was formed primarily to combat.

Foreign nations would inevitably regard the alliance of the United States with a selected few of its Latin American neighbors as an illustration of the lion and the lamb lying down together,—with the lamb inside,—and much to the detriment of the lion's digestion and prestige among the other beasts of the jungle. A distinguished London journalist,⁴ who is a representative of his paper in this country, has frankly declared that such a suggestion is rank cowardice, a confession of weakness which a great nation like ours has no right to make; and he assured his audience that Great Britain would never be dictated to by Latin Americans, even though allied with the United States.

The distinguished Director General of the Pan-American Union has broadened the A. B. C. suggestion to include *all* of Latin America and to substitute the "Pan-American," for the "Monroe," Doctrine. This is a revival of Bolivar's dream of a Pan-American amphictyonic council, sitting at Panama, and checking the nefarious designs of the Holy Alliance. Pan-Hellenism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism are thus to be followed by Pan-Americanism.⁵ But if too much lamb might impair the lion's digestion, what might be expected from the addition of so many mice, and mice of a peculiarly tough and indigestible quality? The Latin Americans themselves would probably object to the achievement of such a meal: "But not on us," the oysters said (in response to the supper invitation of the walrus), "And they

⁴Mr. A. Maurice Low, of the London *Morning Post*.

⁵Another recent illustration of the Pan-Americanism abroad in the land is a suggestion by Senator Falls, of New Mexico, that *all* American coast-wise commerce be exempt from the payment of Panama Canal tolls.

shed a salty tear." For the relations of our republic toward many of its neighbors in the past have partaken too much of that policy which has been graphically described as "a quick succession of kicks and kindness," to make such a proposal acceptable in entire confidence. Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Chile, even Haiti, might be suspicious of entering into an alliance on unequal terms with the American eagle, whose talons have been felt more than once on their soil; and to an alliance with them on equal terms,—it would seem better to throw the Monroe Doctrine overboard at once and invite Chaos to climb on board and thus avoid the long and poignant agony which would inevitably intervene before that goddess eventually took control.

What alternative, then, is left? If the Monroe Doctrine is not to be declared obsolete and to be utterly discarded, if it can not now, in face of the imperative demands of twentieth century civilization, be repressed within the straight-jacket of its modest original; if no attempt should be made to induce the great Powers of Europe to give their formal assent to the United States' enforcement of it, and if no alliance with them should be made to aid the United States in its enforcement; if an "American Concert," including the United States and the A. B. C. Powers, be impracticable and undesirable, and even more impracticable and undesirable a Pan-American Concert; what other refuge is there?

There are two alternatives left, namely, the strictly *national*, and the genuinely international, or what I have ventured elsewhere to call the *supranational*,⁶ sanction.

The advocates of the strictly national enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, of its enforcement by the United States alone, form very probably at present the great majority of our fellow-countrymen; but this majority is daily decreasing as the logic of accumulating events is brought irresistibly home to them. Of course, "we've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too;" and if put to it we can still, doubtless, "lick all creation."

But the process of keeping constantly prepared for so animated a struggle is found to be increasingly expensive, and a resort to an

⁶*Cf.*, an address on "The Primary Sources of International Obligations," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Fifth Annual Meeting, Washington, D. C., 1911 (pp. 280-288).

income tax in a time of profound peace for the purpose of enabling us to expend two-thirds of the annual revenue on military objects is not greatly relished by the large and intelligent part of our citizenship upon whom the tax falls.

Our merchants and financiers who deal with Latin America are increasingly aware that the United States' individual responsibility for the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine lies like a lion across the path of their future opportunities for doing an increasing business with our rapidly developing neighbors; and they find, too, that their Old World competitors in these fields are utilizing the unpopularity of our government's policy to secure the lion's share of railroad and other concessions and of the foreign commerce. The growing importance of a foreign market as a stimulus and outlet for our domestic industry is being appreciated so keenly by our chambers of commerce that they are making their voice heard in favor of the repeal of the Panama tolls exemption clause; the light of a similar experience may be expected to dawn upon them in no distant future from the problem of the Monroe Doctrine as well.

Meanwhile, the upper branch of our Congress, less sensitive at present to changes in public opinion than is the lower branch, advances the necessity of preserving sacred the Monroe Doctrine as a reason for rejecting any such policy of "truckling" to Great Britain and the other commercial nations of the Old World as is discovered in the repeal of the tolls exemption clause. Still more menacing to our responsibility for the Monroe Doctrine were considered the general arbitration treaties of 1911 with Great Britain and France, and the Senate accordingly rejected them.

Unfortunately, the Senate's determination that no degree of arbitration,—not even the *compromise* clause in greatly restricted general treaties,—shall be permitted to infringe upon our monopoly of the Monroe Doctrine, persists side by side with, and is the prime cause of, the suspicion and ill-will which bursts forth from time to time between our country and such natural and traditional friends as Germany and Japan.

This sensitiveness as to the safety of the Monroe Doctrine has not brought with it a corresponding backwardness in claiming all the rights and privileges pertaining to it. For example, neither Old World Powers, nor other American republics, besides the one sole champion

of the Monroe Doctrine, may be permitted to share in the building, ownership or control of any canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The right of fortifying the Panama Canal has been followed by the assertion that we have also the right to discriminate in favor of our own ships passing through it,—the diplomatic history of seventy years and the existence of a precise treaty to the contrary notwithstanding. "A leetle country never misconstrues a treaty with a big one," says the Albany philosopher;⁷ "that is contrary to self-preservation and the law of nations. A leetle country allus construes a treaty with a big one jest the same from fust to last, strictly in accordance with its original meanin' an' intent; but a big nation ain't so gol blamed hide-bound ner bigoted, not by a long sight. If we ever want anything down in Guatemala that we can't git except with the aid of a handful o' blue-jackets an' a marine band, we'll discover a reason fer landin' 'em [and that will probably be the Monroe Doctrine]; we'll dig up a reserve clause in a peace protocol [or the Monroe Doctrine] that can only be interpreted one way in the light of human progress."

Since we insist on the exclusive possession of the *rights* entailed by the doctrine, the Old World naturally demands that we shall assume the corresponding duties. Its governments accordingly invoke our protection for the lives and property of their citizens in the not infrequent times of Latin American revolt and disorder; its corporations make a similar demand; its merchants insist that we shall suppress civil warfare in the interest of neutral commerce; and its peoples assume that it is our duty to put an end to the inhumanity which may be discovered in the rubber-fields of Peru or Bolivia. The Latin American governments, also, have kept us tolerably busy in defending their only available assets, namely, their custom-houses and territory, from the pressing claims of the Old World creditors; and even our own industrial corporations are demanding that our government shall intervene in their behalf against their Old World rivals, lest the latter should infringe upon the Monroe Doctrine by securing concessions from Latin American governments which might place those governments under foreign control, or which might prevent valuable deposits of oil from finding their natural destiny in the tanks of United States warships, the chief object of which is to enforce the

⁷"Epaphroditus Small," *alias* Simon Creel (see the *New York Sun*, April 3, 1914).

Monroe Doctrine, largely in Latin America's behalf. Thus runs the argument in its vicious circle.

So elastic has this doctrine become under the strain of twentieth century cosmopolitanism that so good a friend of our country as the President of the Argentine Republic has characterized it as being made of gutta percha.⁸ So indefinite has it become in consequence of our country's attempt to make it apply to every new international emergency that no jurist or publicist outside of our own country can satisfactorily define it; and it is much to be doubted if we can do so ourselves. When it is finally laid to rest, its epitaph may well be: Here lies one whose name was writ in water.

From the point of view of our own republican form of government,—of our own constitution,—the assumption by our government of the exclusive enforcement of the doctrine is open to serious question. The American Revolution was due to Great Britain's adoption of an exaggerated Monroe Doctrine in dealing with its colonies. The Declaration of Independence is opposed to the claim of one nation to coerce the political status of another. Senator Hoar declared in a memorable address: "I maintain that holding in subjection an alien people, governing them against their will for any fancied advantage to them, is not only not an end provided for by the Constitution, but it is an end prohibited therein." The Constitution established a government of, by, and for the people of the *United States*, and certainly did not provide for a paternalistic government of foreign peoples. Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution was never designed to read: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this *Hemisphere* a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature can not be convened), or even without such application, it shall protect them against domestic violence." Our first President's strict appeal for obedience to the Constitution was so far forgotten by a recent President that, as he himself admits: "I took the Canal Zone and left Congress to debate, not the Canal, but me;" and again: "The Constitution did not explicitly give me power to bring about the necessary agreement with Santo Domingo [to collect and administer that republic's revenues]; but the Constitution did not forbid my doing what I did. I put the agreement into

⁸Dr. R. Saenz Peña, in the first volume of his *Memoirs*, Buenos Aires, 1914.

effect, and I continued its execution two years before the Senate acted.—The Senate adjourned without any action at all.—I went ahead and administered the proposed treaty anyhow, considering it a simple agreement on the part of the Executive which would be converted into a treaty whenever the Senate acted.” Thus near the verge of imperialism, at home as well as abroad, has the Monroe Doctrine and our exclusive administration of it brought us. It is small wonder that the Senate should have struggled with the Executive so ardently under President Roosevelt’s administration and that similar acts on the part of his successor caused the late Democratic chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations to introduce a resolution in the Senate forbidding the use of the United States’ military forces in lands not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

Such are the insuperable and increasing difficulties, the fundamental objections, to the strictly national, or the United States go-it-alone, policy of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. This solution of the problem is no longer tolerable, either in itself or in its consequences. The hand-writing on the wall, predicting its relinquishment, and the advancing shadow of its successor, are already to be seen. Not that the eternal principles of right and justice which underlie the doctrine are passing; but that the enforcement of these principles on the sole responsibility of a single one of the forty-six members of the family of nations is tottering to its fall. *Le roi est mort; vive le roi!* The preservation of the integrity of national territory and the maintenance of popular government can never be surrendered; but they can and must be placed under the ægis of the entire family of nations and of a truly international court of justice.

One splendid move was made by the United States itself in the direction of sharing with the rest of the family of nations a portion of the responsibility and burden of the Monroe Doctrine when it secured the adoption by the Second Hague Conference of that proposition to which the name of our own General Porter has been given. This provides for the obligatory arbitration of contractual debts before a resort is had to force for their collection; and it was intended to apply especially to Latin American indebtedness to European creditors. But the collection of contractual indebtedness is only one of the multitudinous ways in which an attack on Latin American territory or self-government may invoke the application of the Monroe Doctrine;

and hence it represents only the first step in the journey which must be made. The neutralization of Latin America by the Third Hague Conference, or, better still, a guarantee by that Conference of the territorial integrity of *all* the members of the family of nations, would not only relieve our country of the burden of sustaining this principle of the Monroe Doctrine, but would apply that just and righteous principle to the entire world. The institution of the Court of Arbitral Justice would be greatly facilitated by such a measure; for the smaller members of the family of nations would be more willing to constitute the court on some one of the plans proposed, if they could be assured that this important element of their sovereignty could not be brought before the bar of a court on which they may not have absolute equality of representation. The ratification of treaties of general and even universal arbitration would also be greatly facilitated, as was shown in the Senate's debate on the treaties of 1911, by this world-wide application of the first principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

The world-wide application of the second principle of the doctrine, namely, the guarantee of a constitutional government, although more difficult, is not, in my humble judgment, impossible. With the triumphant march of constitutional government around the world, it represents already nine points of national law, and the burden of proof against it would be placed by any international court of our time upon the opposing party. National courts are daily grappling with far more difficult cases in equity than would be brought before the international court by, for example, the present political problem in Mexico.

Two precedents have already been created in this field of international law, and although they were set up on a relatively small and obscure part of the international stage, they were established under exceedingly difficult circumstances and were wholly effective. These were, first, the arbitration of the revolutionary struggle between Presidents Bonilla and Davila, of Honduras, in 1911, which resulted in the resignation of the latter, the election of the former, and the end of the civil war; and, second, the issue of an interlocutory decree by the Central American Court of Justice, in 1909, which put an end to a revolutionary movement in Honduras by fixing the *status quo*, and by enjoining the neighboring republics of Guatemala and Salvador from giving aid and comfort to the rebellion.

The sanction back of such an award by the court of *all* the nations at The Hague, including as it would all the *vis maxima* of the twentieth century's diplomacy, commerce, finance, and international public opinion, not to mention, if necessary, an international police force, would be ample for its enforcement.

The crux of this problem, of course, is the getting of such cases into court. But, as the United States knows only too well, the modern world is bound too closely together, and is too much under the dominion of the ideals of civilization, to permit the indefinite running of an open sore in the body politic of any member of the international family. This fact would supply the motive force to bring such cases into the international court; while the medium through which it could be done might well be supplied by some such development of the international commissions of inquiry as is recommended by the Taft arbitration treaties, which development I have had the honor of discussing elsewhere under the name of "The International Grand Jury."⁹

This, then, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, is the solution of the problem of the Monroe Doctrine which I venture to submit to you, believing as I do that it will be the final and wholly desirable solution of a problem which is already difficult and potentially impossible if left to the solution of the United States alone, or of any partial alliances between it and the other Powers, great or small.

THE CHAIRMAN. I suppose, gentlemen, that inasmuch as the subjects are so intimately connected, it would be your pleasure to adjourn any discussion until after the conclusion of the regular program. Acting upon that suggestion, if there be no objection, I have the very great pleasure of introducing Mr. Joseph Wheless, of St. Louis, Missouri, who will examine the question: "What countries benefit by the Monroe Doctrine?"

MR. WHELESS. Mr. Chairman: The symposium of Monroeism which has occupied these sessions for the two days just past, has taken a rather broad scope and has been very illuminating. We have all enjoyed the discussion of this subject from the several standpoints of

⁹*Cp.* an address on "The International Grand Jury," Proceedings of the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, at its Second National Conference, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1911 (pp. 59-69).

the various speakers. It is a privilege and pleasure to very briefly present a paper coming at the Monroe Doctrine from a little different angle, showing the way in which it is regarded in the countries of Latin America.

The title of my remarks, as assigned to me, is the interrogatory, "What countries benefit by the Monroe Doctrine?"

So much has been stated here by distinguished predecessors on this platform, as to the attitude of the United States towards that proposition of President Monroe and the firm and lasting plan of the United States in the maintenance of that proposition, that it is beside me to indulge in any further discussion of that.

I myself "stand pat" on the Monroe Doctrine and on its maintenance as one of the cardinal features of American policy.

There is another word, that I do not know how to pronounce, that I think ought to be decided by this conference. Every single speaker on this platform has pronounced it differently. The word is "hegemony." My friend, Dr. Scott, gave me a pronunciation of it the other day which he said was correct—but I have forgotten it. In one little quotation in my paper it is used three times by the distinguished Chilean publicist, Señor Alvarez. I shall, if I can remember it, pronounce it a different way each time so as to show my deference to the different views of the different gentlemen that have spoken.

This is a very brief paper. I had rather submit this paper under "leave to print" and relieve my system in the short time that I am going to stand here before you of some views I have that have been evoked by the remarks of other gentlemen; but I want to say this, apropos of the closing remarks of my good friend Professor Hull, in his very interesting and instructive paper. I do not believe that the Monroe Doctrine needs any solution. It speaks for itself, and those that run may read and understand what it means; and we are not responsible in any way for the misconceptions of it, of what Señor Alvarez calls the confusion of ideas existing not only at home but abroad in respect to what the true intent and purpose of that proposition is.